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WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE: WHY THE PRISON 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT DOES NOT—AND SHOULD 
NOT—CLASSIFY PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS 
PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
Lisa Benedetti 
Abstract: The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) arose from Congress’s 
intent to curb frivolous and institutionally invasive prisoner civil rights litigation. In 
furtherance of its goals, the PLRA limits the prospective relief prisoners can receive to such 
relief that is narrowly tailored to the federal rights violation at issue and the least intrusive 
means necessary to correct the violation, otherwise known as the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard. Under the PLRA, prospective relief includes all relief other than 
compensatory monetary damages. However, while the courts have frequently applied and 
interpreted the PLRA over the past decade, only one circuit has addressed whether 
prospective relief as defined in the PLRA includes punitive damages. In Johnson v. Breeden,1 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the term “prospective relief” includes punitive damages and 
that as a result, the PLRA requires that punitive damages conform to the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard. This Comment argues that based on the inherent differences between 
punitive damages and prospective relief, the text of the PLRA, and the legislative intent 
behind the statute, prospective relief as defined by the PLRA does not, and should not, 
encompass punitive damages awarded to prisoners for violations of federal law. 
INTRODUCTION 
One day after work detail, a prisoner held in a United States 
correctional facility returns to his cell.2 He passes a prison guard who 
questions him about his possession of food items from the prison store. 
Without warning, the guard chokes him, punches him in the face, and 
throws him to the ground. The guard then kicks him, stomps on him, and 
beats him with a baton until the prisoner loses consciousness. The 
prisoner wakes up in the infirmary with multiple bruises, contusions, and 
lacerations. The prison investigates the incident and, as a result, fires the 
guard. 
The prisoner files a civil action against the guard, alleging a violation 
of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment while imprisoned.3 The jury finds in the prisoner’s favor and 
                                                     
1. 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). 
2. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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awards him $25,000 in compensatory damages plus $45,000 in punitive 
damages. The trial court upholds the punitive damages award, finding it 
not grossly excessive or arbitrary given the actual damages the prisoner 
suffered and the particularly egregious nature of the guard’s conduct—
the general standard imposed upon punitive damages.4 
On appeal, the circuit court holds that under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 19955 (PLRA), punitive damages constitute “prospective 
relief” and as such must comply with the statute’s restrictions on 
prospective relief. Specifically, such relief must be narrowly tailored to 
the federal rights violation at issue and be the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation,6 also known as the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard.7 Based on this standard, the circuit court 
overturns the punitive damages award, holding that by firing the guard, 
the prison fully corrected the federal rights violation and that awarding 
punitive damages would therefore violate the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard. Thus, despite having sustained serious injury as a 
result of an egregious and intentional violation of his constitutional 
rights, the prisoner receives no punitive damages. 
The Eleventh Circuit made such a scenario more likely when it 
decided Johnson v. Breeden.8 There, the court held that the PLRA 
classifies punitive damages as prospective relief, and as a result, courts 
must ensure that any punitive damages awarded with respect to prison 
conditions meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard.9 This 
decision potentially increases the likelihood that other courts will take a 
similar approach and will reduce—or even eliminate—punitive damages 
awards even where a prisoner’s federal rights have been intentionally 
and egregiously violated.10 
                                                     
4. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18 (2003). 
5. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996). 
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (2006) (“The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief 
unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct 
the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation 
of the Federal right.”). 
7. Alison Brill, Comment, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 658 (2008). 
8. 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). 
9. Id. at 1325. 
10. See Mitchell v. McDonell (Mitchell I), No. 3:06-180-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 5429704, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2008) (“Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages. In any complaint concerning 
conditions of an inmate’s confinement . . . [the PLRA] prohibits the award of any ‘prospective 
relief’ which is not ‘necessary to correct a violation’ of federal rights. ‘Prospective relief’ is defined 
[by the PLRA] to be all relief other than compensatory damages. Since by definition punitive 
damages are not compensatory damages nor damages which ‘correct a violation’ of a plaintiff’s 
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This Comment examines whether the PLRA in fact classifies punitive 
damages as prospective relief in light of each remedy’s history and 
purpose, the text of the PLRA, and the legislative intent behind the 
statute. Part I compares and contrasts punitive damages with prospective 
relief and shows how they have historically been treated as two separate 
remedies that serve different purposes. Part II describes the history of the 
PLRA and shows how it was enacted to address two main issues: 
frivolous prisoner lawsuits and judicial micromanagement of prison 
conditions. Part III describes the Johnson opinion and its holding that 
prospective relief under the PLRA includes punitive damages. Part IV 
argues that the Johnson court erred when it held that the PLRA includes 
punitive damages as a form of prospective relief. 
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PROSPECTIVE RELIEF ARE 
DIFFERENT REMEDIES THAT SERVE DISTINCT PURPOSES 
Punitive damages and prospective relief have long been treated as 
separate legal remedies. Punitive damages punish or deter behavior 
based on past conduct through the imposition of monetary awards, 
whereas prospective relief prohibits or compels future conduct via court-
ordered injunctions. This Part examines the histories and purposes of 
these two forms of relief and demonstrates that courts consistently 
recognize them as different remedies that serve distinct—and often 
divergent—goals. 
A. Punitive Damages Punish or Deter Reprehensible Conduct 
Punitive damages are non-compensatory monetary awards used 
primarily to punish or deter reprehensible conduct.11 They originated in 
                                                     
rights, but rather are punishment for a defendant’s wrongdoing, they are unavailable.”), adopted in 
part by Mitchell v. McDonell (Mitchell II), No. 3:06-cv-180-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 5429701, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2008) (declining to adopt the portion of the magistrate’s opinion denying 
punitive damages recovery from the plaintiff); cf. Hudson v. Singleton, No. CV602-137, 2006 WL 
839339 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2006) (suggesting that punitive damages would not be the least intrusive 
means of correcting the constitutional violation at issue had the prison administration showed 
interest in punishing the officer responsible for violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights). 
11. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[P]unitives are 
aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (describing punitive damages 
as non-compensatory damages awarded in excess of actual harm suffered to punish and deter 
reprehensible conduct and to express the fact finder’s moral condemnation of the conduct in 
question); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “punitive damages” as 
“[d]amages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, 
malice, or deceit; specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an 
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eighteenth-century England, where courts awarded punitive damages as 
a way of compensating “for mental distress or for intangible losses.”12 
Although punitive damages used to possess this compensatory element, 
as the definition of compensatory damages broadened, the definition of 
punitive damages shifted toward a “more purely punitive” one.13 As a 
result of their punitive nature, they are often viewed as “quasi-criminal” 
awards even though they are only awarded in civil cases.14 
Under federal law, punitive damages may be awarded to a prisoner 
claiming a defendant violated his federal rights where the “defendant’s 
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it 
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights 
of others.”15 Juries are responsible for deciding whether to award 
punitive damages and how large the award should be.16 Courts are 
responsible for reviewing such awards for reasonableness.17 
States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, but 
from a constitutional perspective, courts may only reduce or reverse 
awards that are “grossly excessive or arbitrary.”18 Courts must consider 
three factors when reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages: 
“(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the 
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff 
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the 
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in comparable cases.”19 According to the Supreme Court, 
“[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.”20 Thus, the standard for reviewing punitive damages awards 
incorporates a recognition of the stated purposes of punitive damages—
                                                     
example to others”). 
12. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 456 (2d ed. 1993). 
13. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437–38 n.11. 
14. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (1994); see also Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432. 
15. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). While the Supreme Court decided Smith prior to 
passage of the PLRA, this case remains good law. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Smith favorably for the proposition that prisoners can seek punitive damages in a 
post-PLRA prisoner lawsuit); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); 
Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). 
16. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (2009). 
17. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2623 (2008). 
18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
19. Id. at 418 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 
20. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
Benedetti_DTPed[1].doc (Do Not Delete) 2/12/2010 11:33 AM 
2010] PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE PLRA 135 
 
to punish and deter reprehensible conduct—as well as an 
acknowledgement of the jury’s role as the primary appraiser of those 
damages. 
B. Prospective Relief Compels or Prohibits Future Conduct in Order 
to Correct or Prevent a Violation of the Law 
The concept of prospective relief arose out of Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.21 The Eleventh Amendment 
generally bars suits against a state and state officials sued in their official 
capacity absent a waiver by the state or a congressional override.22 This 
bar prohibits suits against state officials seeking “retroactive” or 
“retrospective” relief. 23 However, the Eleventh Amendment does not 
bar suits against state officials to enjoin those officials from enforcing 
state law,24 action which has come to be known as prospective relief.25 
While the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief has at 
many times been unclear or inadequate, most courts and commentators 
interpret the prospective-retrospective distinction as barring suits 
seeking damages and damage-like monetary remedies.26 Thus, under  
 
                                                     
21. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of 
the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 
(1998). 
22. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). 
23. E.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (“Federal courts may not award 
retrospective relief, for instance, money damages or its equivalent, if the State invokes its 
immunity.”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) 
(explaining that “suits seeking prospective, but not compensatory or other retrospective relief, may 
be brought against state officials in federal court challenging the constitutionality of official conduct 
enforcing state law” (emphasis added)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (“[A] federal 
court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment . . . may not include a retroactive 
award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.” (internal citations omitted)). 
24. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (“[A] suit against individuals for the purpose of 
preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of 
the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of [the Eleventh] 
Amendment.” (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518 (1898))). 
25. See Frew, 540 U.S. at 437 (“To ensure the enforcement of federal law . . . the Eleventh 
Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation 
of federal law.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“[S]ince [Ex parte Young], we 
often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only 
prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law.” (citation and 
internal quotations omitted)); Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146 (“[T]he [Ex parte Young] exception 
is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief . . . [and] does not permit judgments against state 
officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.”). See also Vázquez, supra note 21, at 2. 
26. See Vázquez, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
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Eleventh Amendment law, punitive damages are retrospective, not 
prospective.27 
The prototypical example of prospective relief is the injunction.28 Just 
as prospective relief commands state officials to refrain from acting in 
violation of federal law,29 injunctive relief commands defendants to act 
or not act in accordance with a court order.30 As a result, the history of 
and law behind injunctive relief is helpful for understanding prospective 
relief. 
Historically, when the American legal system distinguished between 
courts of law and courts of equity, injunctive relief was a remedy 
exclusively available in courts of equity.31 In 1938, the courts of law and 
equity in the United States merged;32 however, some remnants of the 
division between law and equity still remain. For example, under the 
Seventh Amendment, plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a jury trial 
when seeking a legal remedy but not an equitable one.33 Thus, when a 
plaintiff requests both legal and equitable relief and demands a trial by 
jury, a jury must consider the legal questions, but a judge decides the 
equitable claims.34 
Courts subject injunctive relief to its own unique legal standards. To 
decide whether injunctive relief should be granted, courts weigh four 
factors: (1) the likelihood of harm to the plaintiff absent the relief; (2) 
the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the relief is granted; (3) the 
likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits of the case; and (4) the 
public interest.35 Once a court decides injunctive relief is warranted, that 
                                                     
27. See Mohler v. Mississippi, 782 F.2d 1291, 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 
437 (noting that retrospective relief seeks monetary damages or its equivalent); Green v. Mansour, 
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“[D]eterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”). 
28. Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a “Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 138 (2006). 
29. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
30. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 5–6 (2d ed. 2006). 
31. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 11. 
32. Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of 
Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 653 (1990) (noting the merger of law and equity in the federal courts). 
33. Bryan Hart, Comment, Burden of Proof for Employee Numerosity under § 1981a Statutory 
Damages Caps, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1657, 1671 (2008). 
34. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 
470–73 (1962). 
35. Ryan McLeod, Comment, Injunction Junction: Remembering the Proper Function and Form 
of Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0013, at ¶ 10, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr0013.html (citing Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, 
Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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relief must be narrowly tailored to the legal violation at issue36 and be no 
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to remedy the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct and provide the plaintiff with complete 
relief.37 Thus, the standards for injunctive relief balance the interest of 
providing the plaintiff with complete relief against the interest of 
burdening the defendant no more than necessary to remedy the wrongful 
conduct. 
C. Courts Recognize the Inherent Differences Between Punitive 
Damages and Injunctive Relief by Subjecting Them to Different 
Restrictions 
In recognition of the differences between punitive damages and 
injunctive relief, courts subject these remedies to different restrictions. 
For example, courts generally do not hold a defendant in contempt for 
failure to pay monetary damages but often will do so to enforce 
injunctions.38 Also, unlike damages, injunctive relief is subject to 
modification.39 Similarly, courts maintain the distinction between 
monetary damages and injunctions by refraining from ordering 
injunctive relief where monetary damages serve as an adequate remedy40 
or where the order would be for payment of monetary damages.41 Still, 
injunctive relief can result in monetary expenditures for a defendant, as 
it may include costly requirements such as hiring additional staff or 
building new facilities.42 
Also, as shown above, punitive damages and prospective relief are 
subjected to different legal standards that take into account their distinct 
purposes. Courts evaluate punitive damages awards based primarily on 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s motives and conduct.43 In 
                                                     
36. E.g., United States v. Schulz, 517 F.3d 606, 607 (2d Cir. 2008); NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
486 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir. 2007) (Tymkovich, J., concurring); Fiber Sys. Int’l v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 
1150, 1159 (5th Cir. 2006); McLendon v. Cont’l Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). 
37. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 
U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
38. DOBBS, supra note 12, at 152. 
39. FISCHER, supra note 30, at 318. 
40. McLeod, supra note 35, at ¶ 9. 
41. DOBBS, supra note 12, at 152. 
42. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1992) (discussing a 
consent decree requiring the construction of a new jail facility); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 
1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a plaintiff’s request for relief in the form of additional correctional 
staff). 
43. See supra notes 15, 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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contrast, injunctive relief standards focus primarily on the harm to the 
plaintiff, and when imposing injunctive relief, the courts tailor it as 
narrowly as possible to the goal of assuring that the plaintiff receives 
complete relief.44 In this respect, punitive damages and injunctive relief 
serve divergent purposes: while punitive damages are meant to be 
intrusive, as a way of punishing the defendant, injunctive relief must be 
the least intrusive method of providing a plaintiff with a remedy. Thus, 
the very different histories of punitive damages and prospective relief 
demonstrate how these two remedies serve different purposes and, as a 
result, are subject to different requirements. 
II. THE PLRA WAS DIRECTED AT FRIVOLOUS PRISONER 
SUITS AND JUDICIAL MICROMAGEMENT OF PRISONS 
The PLRA arose from Congress’s concern over two issues: a 
perceived flood of frivolous prisoner lawsuits and a perceived increase 
in the judicial micromanagement of prison conditions. This Part 
describes the context in which these concerns arose and how the PLRA 
addresses them. 
A. A Steady Increase in Prisoner Litigation and the Use of Broad 
Consent Decrees to Resolve Those Disputes Impelled Congress to 
Pass the PLRA 
Before the 1960s, federal courts maintained a “hands-off” policy 
regarding prison administration.45 The courts would not inquire into the 
treatment or discipline of prisoners except in the limited context of 
“torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges.”46 
However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court became more 
receptive to prisoner lawsuits and permitted prisoners to seek remedies 
for violations of their constitutional rights.47 The courts quickly 
                                                     
44. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
45. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (noting how federal courts have 
traditionally taken the position that prisons “require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the 
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of government”). 
46. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
47. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (“[T]hough his rights may be 
diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly 
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime.”); Martinez, 416 U.S. at 
405 (“[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid 
constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution.”). For a more detailed 
description of the history and eventual abandonment of the hands-off policy, see Gilmore v. 
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experienced an increase in prisoner litigation: while in 1966 only 218 
such cases were filed, that number rose to 9730 by 1978,48 and to 39,008 
by 1995,49 the year Congress debated adopting the PLRA. In relative 
terms, prisoners filed 6.3 lawsuits for every 1000 prisoners in 1970, but 
filed 24.6 lawsuits for every 1000 prisoners in 1995.50 
With the increase in prisoner litigation came an increase in the 
popularity of consent decrees—court enforced settlements agreed to by 
the litigants in lieu of going to trial.51 Prisoner-plaintiffs preferred 
consent decrees because they allowed agreement to broad, institution-
wide remedies that exceeded the bounds of merely correcting the 
constitutional violations at issue.52 Administrator-defendants preferred 
them because they eliminated the need for a finding of, or admission to, 
the existence of a constitutional violation.53 All parties benefited from 
the elimination of the risks and costs associated with litigation that 
consent decrees provided.54 
In prisoner litigation, consent decrees generally order future changes 
to the prison or prison system in question, such as restricting the ability 
of prison officials to search through an inmate’s legal papers,55 requiring 
the facilities to review existing staffing levels and hire additional 
correctional staff if necessary,56 ordering the construction of new 
facilities,57 and capping the number of inmates housed at a given 
facility.58 Some consent decrees have stayed in effect for years, even 
decades, after their initial implementation.59 Consent decrees must be 
                                                     
California, 220 F.3d 987, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2000). 
48. William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the 
Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 611 (1979). 
49. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2003). 
50. Id. at 1583. While acknowledging an increase in prisoner civil rights litigation since the 
1960s, Margo Schlanger points out that the relative number of such lawsuits peaked not in the mid-
1990s, but rather in 1981, and that the increase in the absolute number of such lawsuits after 1981 is 
more attributable to an increase in the number of prisoners than to an increase in prisoner 
litigiousness. See id. at 1585–87. 
51. See Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 995 (discussing “second and third generation prison conditions 
cases,” which involved prison administrators agreeing to wide-ranging consent decrees instead of 
litigating the alleged constitutional violation). 
52. Brill, supra note 7, at 655–56. 
53. Id. at 656. 
54. Id. at 655. 
55. Wycoff v. Hedgepeth, 34 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1994). 
56. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994). 
57. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1992). 
58. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 842 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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approved and enforced by the courts, including, when necessary, judicial 
supervision over prison conditions, imposition of sanctions, and 
modification of relief.60 
Although consent decrees had their advantages, some critics blamed 
the decrees for “limit[ing] state penal policy and prosecutorial 
discretion” and “escalating prison costs.”61 They blamed the federal 
judges who approved and enforced the decrees for “exceeding their 
powers and usurping state executive functions.”62 In 1995, Sarah 
Vandenbraak, then-Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania,63 wrote specifically about a nine-year-old consent decree 
under which the Philadelphia criminal justice system operated, saying 
that it had persisted so long in the face of opposition from Philadelphia’s 
elected leaders that “it no longer enjoy[ed] the consent of the 
governed.”64 It was in this climate that Congress responded to these 
criticisms by passing the PLRA.65 
The PLRA was introduced to Congress in two parts of House 
Resolution 667: Title II, entitled “Stopping Abusive Prisoner Lawsuits,” 
and Title III, entitled “Stop Turning Out Prisoners.”66 Proponents of the 
PLRA saw it as rectifying two main problems with prisoner litigation: a 
perceived flood of frivolous prisoner lawsuits and the perceived judicial 
micromanagement of prison conditions.67 
                                                     
59. See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. at 401 (seeking to modify a 1979 consent decree in 1992); Kindred 
v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 1993) (seeking to modify a 1977 consent decree in 1993). 
60. See Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). 
61. Brill, supra note 7, at 656; see also Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Immigrants Denied Their Day in 
Court, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 1996, at A15 (criticizing judicial enforcement of 
consent decrees as leading to “overcrowding, the early release of dangerous felons, higher costs to 
taxpayers and a massive prison building program”). 
62. Brill, supra note 7, at 656–57. 
63. Id. at 657 n.69. 
64. Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Bail, Humbug! Why Criminals Would Rather Be in Philadelphia, 73 
POL’Y REV. 73, 73 (1995), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/ 
3565992.html. 
65. Brill, supra note 7, at 657. 
66. Richard J. Costa, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Legitimate Attempt to 
Curtail Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits and End the Alleged Micro-Management of State Prisons or a 
Violation of Separation of Powers?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 325 n.30 (1997); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-21, at 5 (1995). 
67. Costa, supra note 66, at 319. 
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B. Title II Addressed the Perceived Flood of Prisoner Suits by 
Limiting When Prisoners Can Sue and Requiring Courts to Identify 
and Dismiss Frivolous Lawsuits Early 
Title II aimed to stem the tide of frivolous prisoner lawsuits filed 
against prisons and prison officials. The House Judiciary Committee 
Report describing the PLRA asserts that “frivolous lawsuits” clogged the 
courts and undermined the “administration of justice,” and that Title II 
would place “sensible limits” on the ability of prisoners to challenge the 
conditions of their confinement.68 This report tracks similar arguments 
made by proponents of the PLRA on the House and Senate floors. For 
example, Senator Bob Dole remarked that he had witnessed an 
“alarming explosion” in lawsuits filed by prisoners and warned that 
these lawsuits “tie up the courts, waste valuable judicial and legal 
resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding 
population.”69 He further argued that the resources spent defending these 
suits “could be better spent prosecuting criminals, fighting illegal drugs, 
or cracking down on consumer fraud.”70 Similarly, Senator Spencer 
Abraham asserted that the courts dismissed over ninety-five percent of 
prisoner lawsuits71 as a way of emphasizing the frivolous nature of the 
suits. Senator Orrin Hatch saw Title II as a means of “preventing 
inmates from abusing the Federal judicial system” but emphasized that it 
was not intended to prevent the litigation of “legitimate claims” by 
prisoners.72 
In furtherance of its goal, Title II contains provisions that discourage 
prisoners from filing frivolous or premature cases and require courts to 
identify and dismiss such cases early. First, prisoners filing in forma 
pauperis must still generally pay the full filing fee.73 Second, prisoners 
must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing a case in court.74 
Third, courts must screen prisoner cases at the earliest opportunity and 
dismiss them if the claims are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 
                                                     
68. H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 7. 
69. 141 CONG. REC. 14,570–71 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole); accord 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 
(letter from the National Association of Attorneys General stating that “[a]lthough occasional 
meritorious claims absorb state resources, nonetheless, we believe the vast majority of the $81.3 
million figure [estimated cost of inmate civil suits to the states] is attributable to the non-meritorious 
suits”). 
70. 141 CONG. REC. 14,571 (remarks of Sen. Dole). 
71. Id. at 26,449 (remarks of Sen. Abraham). 
72. Id. at 27,042 (remarks of Sen. Hatch). 
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). 
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upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from immune 
defendants.75 Fourth, prisoners who have previously brought three or 
more prisoner cases that were dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, 
or for failing to state a claim may not bring a prisoner action in forma 
pauperis “unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury.”76 Fifth, the court may revoke a prisoner’s unvested 
earned release credit if the court finds that the prisoner filed a malicious 
claim, filed a claim with the sole intent to harass the defendant, or 
presented false testimony or evidence to the court.77 Finally, prisoners 
may not bring causes of action without first showing they suffered a 
physical injury.78 
C. Title III Addressed the Perceived Judicial Micromanagement of 
Prison Conditions by Making it Harder for Federal Judges to 
Order Injunctive Relief 
Title III addressed Congress’s second goal: ending the continued 
“micromanaging” of prison facilities by the courts. The House 
Committee Report describing the PLRA reflects that purpose, 
particularly underscoring Title III’s effect on court-ordered population 
caps: 
 Title III provides much needed relief by providing reasonable 
limits on the remedies available in prison crowding suits. The 
title limits court-ordered relief to those specific conditions 
affecting the individual plaintiff, and requires the court to 
consider the potential impact of such relief on public safety. 
Title III includes provisions that will guard against court-ordered 
caps dragging on and on, with nothing but the whims of federal 
judges sustaining them.79 
The Report emphasizes the role of prison population caps in causing 
“revolving door justice”80 and decries judges for “imposing remedies 
intended to effect an overall modernization of local prison systems or 
provide an overall improvement in prison conditions.”81 It asserts that 
Title III addressed these problems by “limiting the remedies that can be 
                                                     
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 
76. Id. § 1915(g). 
77. Id. § 1932. 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
79. H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 7–8 (1995). 
80. Id. at 9. 
81. Id. at 24 n.2. 
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granted or enforced by a court in a prison conditions suit alleging a 
violation of a federal right.”82 It notes, however, that Title III’s basic 
restrictions on court-ordered relief were “not a departure from current 
jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief.”83 
The House Report tracks comments on the House and Senate floors 
made by proponents of the bill. For example, Senator Dole decried court 
enforced population caps as “[p]erhaps the most pernicious form of 
judicial micromanagement.”84 Senator Abraham saw the 
overinvolvement of federal judges in prison administration as raising 
prison costs unnecessarily, undermining the punitive and deterrent effect 
of prison, and leading to the release of dangerous criminals into 
society.85 He further claimed that “[p]eople deserve to keep their tax 
dollars or have them spent on projects they approve . . . . [rather than] on 
keeping prisoners in conditions some Federal judge feels are desirable 
(although not required by any provision of the Constitution or any law)” 
and asserted that Title III would eliminate consent decrees “under which 
judges control the prisons literally for decades.”86 However, he claimed 
to have no desire to eliminate all judicial relief, only “to retain it for 
cases where it is needed while curtailing its destructive use.”87 Similarly, 
Representative Charles Canady saw Title III as a positive step toward 
stopping the “overinvolvement” of the federal courts in prison 
management and enabling local governments and states to “obtain relief 
in an expeditious manner.”88 
When discussing the perceived judicial micromanagement of prison 
systems, Senator Abraham cited what he saw as prototypical examples 
of that micromanagement, such as federal courts dictating “1. How 
warm the food is. 2. How bright the lights are. 3. Whether there are 
electrical outlets in each cell. 4. Whether windows are inspected and up 
to code. 5. Whether prisoners’ hair is cut only by licensed barbers. 6. 
And whether air and water temperatures are comfortable.”89 He 
emphasized that “[m]ost fundamentally, the proposed bill forbids courts 
from entering orders for prospective relief (such as regulating food  
 
                                                     
82. Id. at 8. 
83. Id. at 24 n.2. 
84. 141 CONG. REC. 26,549 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole). 
85. Id. at 26,448 (remarks of Sen. Abraham). 
86. Id. at 26,449. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 4368 (remarks of Rep. Canady). 
89. Id. at 26,448 (remarks of Sen. Abraham). 
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temperatures) unless the order is necessary to correct violations of 
individual plaintiffs’ Federal rights.”90 
Newspaper publications written around the time Congress debated 
and passed the PLRA echoed the sentiments of the congressional 
proponents of the bill. For example, one editorial discussed how the 
judicial enforcement of consent decrees led to “overcrowding, the early 
release of dangerous felons, higher costs to taxpayers and a massive 
prison building program.”91 Similarly, the Philadelphia Inquirer called 
the statute a “legislative end run around U.S. District Judge Norma 
Shapiro,” the judge known for strictly enforcing population caps on the 
Philadelphia prisons under its then nine-year-old consent decree.92 
In furtherance of its goal, Title III contains various limitations on 
when and to what extent prospective relief may be ordered. First and 
foremost, in any civil action regarding prison conditions, a court “shall 
not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that 
such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to 
correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right”93—the need-
narrowness-intrusiveness standard.94 When evaluating whether an order 
meets the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard, courts must give 
“substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the 
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief”95 and may 
only order a government official to exceed his state or local authority 
under a few prescribed situations.96 Even consent decrees, which are 
normally agreed upon by the parties and involve no formal finding of a 
federal rights violation,97 must meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness 
standard.98 
The PLRA places particularly strong restrictions on court-ordered 
prison releases. For example, prison release orders may only be ordered 
by a three-judge panel after the prison system has had a reasonable 
                                                     
90. Id. at 26,449. 
91. Editorial, Proposed STOP Bill Would Restrict Federal Judges, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 30, 
1995, at 42A. 
92. Julia Cass, Attached to U.S. Spending Bill is a Rider Curbing Prison Caps, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Oct. 3, 1995, at B4; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
94. Brill, supra note 7, at 658. 
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
96. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(B). 
97. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1). 
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amount of time to comply with less intrusive relief and either the prison 
failed to comply or the relief failed to remedy the violation.99 
Furthermore, before the panel may enter a prison release order, it must 
find by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary 
cause of the violation of a federal right and that no other relief will 
remedy the violation.100 
The PLRA also provides for the termination or stay of prospective 
relief instead of allowing court-ordered relief to continue indefinitely. 
Any party may move for termination of prospective relief under certain 
time constraints.101 Upon such a motion, the court must immediately 
terminate prospective relief unless it finds the relief “remains necessary 
to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right” and 
conforms to the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard.102 Motions to 
modify or terminate prospective relief operate as mandatory automatic 
stays,103 further highlighting Congress’s desire to limit prospective relief 
granted to prisoners. 
Thus, an examination of the climate immediately preceding the 
adoption of the PLRA, as well as the text and legislative history of the 
statute, demonstrate how the PLRA was enacted to address two specific 
issues—frivolous prisoner lawsuits and judicial micromanagement of 
prison conditions—and how all of the statute’s provisions are geared 
toward eliminating those two problems. 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT UNDER THE PLRA, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
In Johnson v. Breeden,104 the Eleventh Circuit became the first and 
only circuit court to address the issue of whether prospective relief under 
the PLRA includes punitive damages.105 In the case, Ernest Johnson, an 
inmate of Phillips Correctional Institution in Buford, Georgia, alleged 
that on August 22, 1995, multiple corrections officers—including 
                                                     
99. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
100. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E). 
101. Id. § 3626(b)(1). 
102. Id. § 3626(b)(3). 
103. Id. § 3626(e)(2). 
104. 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).  
105. Searches on several legal databases failed to identify any other circuit courts that have 
addressed this issue. See also Angus R. Love, The Prison Litigation Reform Act, in 2008 PA. BAR 
INST., PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 1, 12–14 (noting that only the Eleventh Circuit and a 
few federal district courts have addressed whether punitive damages are prospective relief and citing 
Johnson v. Breeden). 
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defendants Brian Breeden and Rudolph Gomez—subjected Johnson to 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment 
rights by using excessive force against him.106 Johnson maintained that 
the officers, without provocation, choked, punched, kicked, and beat him 
until he lost consciousness and required medical attention.107 In contrast, 
the officers claimed that Johnson “became unruly,” attacked Breeden, 
and injured himself by falling and hitting his head on a heater when the 
officers tried to restrain him.108 A jury found in favor of Johnson and 
awarded him $25,000 in compensatory damages, $30,000 in punitive 
damages from Breeden, and $15,000 in punitive damages from 
Gomez.109 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s award of compensatory 
damages.110 However, the court held that punitive damages are 
“prospective relief” as defined by the PLRA.111 Under the PLRA, 
prospective relief is defined as “all relief other than compensatory 
monetary damages.”112 According to the court, “[t]he plain language of 
that definition provision is clear, and where the statutory language 
provides an explicit definition we apply it even if it differs from the 
term’s ordinary meaning.”113 The court elaborated by noting that 
“Congress has told us that all relief other than compensatory monetary 
damages is ‘prospective relief.’ Punitive damages are relief other than 
compensatory monetary damages. Therefore, punitive damages are 
prospective relief.”114 
Having determined that punitive damages are prospective relief, the 
court further held that the trial court should have analyzed whether the 
punitive damages awarded satisfied the PLRA’s need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard.115 The court recognized the irregularity of calling 
punitive damages prospective relief, saying “[b]ecause Congress has 
provided that punitive damages are prospective relief, we must give the 
requirements of [the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard] some 
                                                     
106. Johnson, at 1311–12. 
107. Id. at 1312. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1328. 
111. Id. at 1325. 
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7) (2006). 
113. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1325 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard). 
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meaning in the context of punitive damages.”116 Regardless, the court 
proceeded to apply the PLRA’s definition of prospective relief to 
punitive damages: 
We think those requirements mean that a punitive damages 
award must be no larger than reasonably necessary to deter the 
kind of violations of the federal right that occurred in the case. 
They also mean that such awards should be imposed against no 
more defendants than necessary to serve that deterrent function 
and that they are the least intrusive way of doing so.117 
The circuit court held that the trial court’s analysis was “conclusory” 
and as such “not enough to satisfy the requirements of [the need-
narrowness-intrusiveness standard].”118 Thus, the circuit court vacated 
the punitive damages award and remanded the case so that the trial court 
could “enter findings that are as specific to the case as the circumstances 
permit.”119 
Since Johnson, only four district court cases have addressed whether 
punitive damages are prospective relief under the PLRA.120 Two arose 
within the Eleventh Circuit and, as such, applied Johnson without 
criticism.121 One district court case in the Third Circuit assumed 
arguendo that Johnson was correct,122 but expressed dissatisfaction with 
the circuit court’s decision: 
At first blush, it seems that one can neither ‘narrowly draw’ 
punitive damages, nor adjust them to better ‘correct’ a violation 
of rights, nor render them any more or less ‘intrusive.’ . . . 
Congress may have intended the PLRA’s ‘prospective relief’ 
                                                     
116. Id. (emphasis added). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1326. 
119. Id. at 1326, 1328. 
120. See Love, supra note 105, at 12–14 (noting three district court cases that had, as of 2008, 
addressed whether punitive damages are prospective relief under the PLRA). Since the publication 
of Love’s article, an additional district court case has addressed the issue. See Mitchell v. McDonell 
(Mitchell I), No. 3:06-180-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 5429704, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2008), adopted 
in part by Mitchell v. McDonell (Mitchell II), No. 3:06-cv-180-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 5429701 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2008). 
121. See Rieara v. Sweat, No. CV205-174, 2007 WL 853465, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2007) 
(noting punitive damages are prospective relief but allowing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages 
to go before the trier of fact, reserving the right for the court to “review the punitive damages award 
[if one is made] to determine the reasonableness of said award”); Hudson v. Singleton, No. CV602-
137, 2006 WL 839339, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2006) (affirming the jury’s award of $10,000 in 
punitive damages against one defendant but reducing the jury’s award of punitive damages against a 
second defendant from $10,000 to $5,000). 
122. See Tate v. Dragovich, No. 96-4495, 2003 WL 21978141, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2003). 
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provisions to apply only to injunctive relief and not punitive 
damages.123 
One magistrate judge in the Third Circuit went even further than 
Johnson by holding that the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness 
standard denies prisoner-plaintiffs any punitive damages under any 
circumstances.124 Specifically, the magistrate judge said: 
Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages. In any complaint 
concerning conditions of an inmate’s confinement . . . [the 
PLRA] prohibits the award of any ‘prospective relief’ which is 
not ‘necessary to correct a violation’ of federal rights. 
‘Prospective relief’ is defined [by the PLRA] to be all relief 
other than compensatory damages. Since by definition punitive 
damages are not compensatory damages nor damages which 
‘correct a violation’ of a plaintiff’s rights, but rather are 
punishment for a defendant’s wrongdoing, they are 
unavailable.125 
This portion of the magistrate’s opinion was not adopted by the 
district court.126 However, the magistrate’s opinion indicates the 
attractiveness of Johnson’s logic and the extent to which that logic can 
be extended to completely deny prisoner-plaintiffs punitive damages. 
IV. THE PLRA DOES NOT—AND SHOULD NOT—CLASSIFY 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
By examining the plain language and legislative history of the PLRA, 
this Part demonstrates why, using canons of statutory construction, the 
PLRA’s definition of prospective relief does not include punitive 
damages.127 First, it applies the canons to the statute and demonstrates 
                                                     
123. Id. at *6 n.7. 
124. See Mitchell I, 2008 WL 5429704, at *2. 
125. Id. 
126. See Mitchell v. McDonell (Mitchell II), No. 3:06-cv-180-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 5429701, at 
*1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2008) (declining to adopt the portion of the magistrate’s opinion denying 
punitive damages recovery from the plaintiff). 
127. Under the canons of statutory construction, where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts will not inquire further into the meaning of the statute. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063–64 (2009). However, a statutory clause should not be interpreted in 
isolation but rather in the context of the entire statute as well as its object and policy. U.S. Nat’l 
Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454–55 (1993). Also, a seemingly 
clear statute will not be given an effect that leads to absurd results. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 
18, 27 (1948). When a statute is ambiguous or when the seemingly clear meaning would lead to 
absurd results, courts may look to extrinsic aids such as the legislative history and purpose of the 
statute to determine the statute’s meaning. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991) 
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that the Eleventh Circuit Court’s interpretation—finding the plain 
language of the statute clear and unambiguous—was wrong. Then, it 
argues that Congress could not have intended to classify punitive 
damages as prospective relief because doing so serves none of 
Congress’s stated goals with regard to the PLRA and withholds an 
important legal tool from those prisoners who need it the most. 
A. Contrary to the Holding in Johnson, the Plain Language of the 
PLRA Does Not Clearly and Unambiguously Categorize Punitive 
Damages as Prospective Relief 
By holding that the plain language of the PLRA is clear, the Johnson 
court failed to properly analyze whether prospective relief includes 
punitive damages. Generally, where a statute’s language is plain and 
unambiguous, no further inquiry into the meaning of the statute is 
required.128 Considered in isolation, the PLRA’s definition of 
prospective relief arguably appears clear. It states that prospective relief 
is “all relief other than compensatory monetary damages.”129 The statute 
defines “relief” expansively to mean “all relief in any form that may be 
granted or approved by the court” not including private settlement 
agreements.130 As previously discussed, punitive damages are monetary, 
but generally non-compensatory, relief.131 Thus, because punitive 
damages are relief other than compensatory monetary damages, punitive 
damages appear to fall within the PLRA’s definition of prospective 
relief. 
However, the clarity of a statute’s language depends not just on one 
clause in isolation but on the context of the statute as a whole,132 and 
even seemingly clear statutes should not be given an effect that leads to 
absurd results.133 When considered based on these criteria, the PLRA’s 
definition of prospective relief no longer clearly encompasses punitive 
damages. The PLRA requires that courts “shall not grant or approve any 
prospective relief” unless the relief satisfies the need-narrowness-
                                                     
(collecting cases). When Congress uses a term of art or a phrase that has acquired a peculiar legal 
meaning, that term or phrase is construed according to its peculiar meaning in the absence of 
legislative intent to the contrary. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 474 (7th ed. 2007). 
128. Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1063–64. 
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7) (2006). 
130. Id. § 3626(g)(9). 
131. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
132. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 454–55. 
133. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948). 
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intrusiveness standard.134 It seems counterintuitive that one can 
“narrowly draw” punitive damages, adjust them to “correct” a violation 
of a federal right, or render them less “intrusive,”135 especially given that 
the purpose of punitive damages is to intrude on wrongdoers by making 
them pay money in excess of the damages that the plaintiff suffered as 
punishment for engaging in reprehensible conduct.136 Yet, if punitive 
damages are prospective relief, the plain language of the PLRA requires 
that they be subject to those restrictions, as evidenced by the mandatory 
language “shall not.” Also, the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness 
standard does not consider either of the two stated goals of punitive 
damages: punishment and deterrence.137 The Johnson court attempted to 
reconcile this contradiction by saying that the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard requires punitive damages to be narrowly drawn 
and extend no further than necessary to deter the federal right violation 
at issue.138 However, this is a strained reading of the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard at best, and furthermore completely ignores the 
punishment aspect of punitive damages. Thus, subjecting punitive 
damages to the PLRA’s mandatory restrictions on prospective relief 
absurdly requires a court to evaluate punitive damages against a standard 
that makes no sense in the context of punitive damages and fails to 
consider any of the goals that punitive damages serve. 
Similarly, the PLRA provides for termination or automatic stays of 
prospective relief,139 two actions that do not apply to punitive damages. 
Both the termination and stay provisions are mandatory, as evidenced by 
the statute’s use of the word “shall.”140 The only way for the court to 
avoid terminating prospective relief is to find that prospective relief 
“remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the 
Federal right” and conforms to the need-narrowness-intrusiveness 
                                                     
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
135. See Tate v. Dragovich, No. 96-4495, 2003 WL 21978141, at *6 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2003) 
(noting the counterintuitive nature of subjecting punitive damages to the PLRA’s need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard). 
136. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
137. Compare supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of punitive 
damages), with supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting the PLRA’s need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard). 
138. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
139. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
140. The PLRA mandates that where prospective relief with respect to prison conditions is 
ordered, “such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener” within certain 
time parameters. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). When a motion to terminate is made, 
that motion “shall operate as a stay” during a specified statutory period. Id. § 3626(e)(2) (emphasis 
added). 
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standard.141 Based on these requirements, if punitive damages are 
prospective relief, one of two equally absurd results would occur: courts 
would be put into the position of either “terminating” the punitive 
damages awarded, thus taking them away from the plaintiff, or defying 
the PLRA’s mandatory termination provision by deeming punitive 
damages non-terminable. Thus, the termination provision of the PLRA 
underscores the paradoxical nature of classifying punitive damages as 
prospective relief. 
Although the statute defines the term “prospective relief” broadly, 
when viewed as a whole the PLRA uses the term in a way that 
approximates injunctive relief, a class of relief which does not include 
punitive damages.142 The connection between prospective relief as used 
by the PLRA and traditional injunctive relief is apparent in the PLRA’s 
requirement that “[p]reliminary injunctive relief shall automatically 
expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes 
the findings required . . . for the entry of prospective relief and makes 
the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period.”143 While the 
court could enter a preliminary injunction and then subsequently enter an 
order for punitive damages, the above clause appears to contemplate 
prospective relief as injunctive relief, and vice versa. 
Given these considerations, the Johnson court erred when it found 
that the language of the PLRA clearly and unambiguously classifies 
punitive damages as prospective relief. In light of this ambiguity, the 
Johnson court should have considered other extrinsic aids such as the 
legislative history and purpose of the PLRA to determine the statute’s 
meaning.144 
B. The Congressional History of the PLRA Exhibits No Intent to 
Classify Punitive Damages as Prospective Relief 
Had the Johnson court examined the legislative history and purpose 
of the PLRA, it would have found no support for the argument that 
Congress intended to classify punitive damages as prospective relief. 
The legislative history of the PLRA contains no record that Congress 
considered the effect the PLRA would have—or should have—on 
punitive damages. At no time does the record discuss punitive damages 
with reference to the goals or effects of the PLRA. 
                                                     
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). 
142. See supra Part I. 
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 
144. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991). 
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On the other hand, the legislative history does indicate that Congress 
considered prospective relief synonymous with injunctive relief—the 
prototypical example of a prospective remedy.145 For example, in 
discussing the PLRA’s restrictions on prospective relief, both the House 
Committee Report to H.R. 667 and members of Congress repeatedly 
referred to judicial micromanaging through court-ordered changes to the 
way prisons are managed, population caps, and mass prisoner releases, 
all prototypical examples of injunctive relief.146 Also, the House 
Committee Report on the PLRA asserts that the PLRA’s need-
narrowness-intrusiveness standard does not represent a departure from 
injunctive relief jurisprudence.147 
Given the historical connection between prospective and injunctive 
relief148 and the legislative history of the PLRA suggesting that Congress 
considered the two terms to be synonymous, it should be presumed that 
Congress intended to adopt the conventional legal meaning of 
prospective relief.149 Classifying punitive damages as prospective relief 
would defy that conventional meaning since doing so constitutes a 
significant departure from injunctive relief jurisprudence150 and would 
require judges to apply a different standard to punitive damages than 
they usually do.151 Thus, the legislative history and purpose of the PLRA 
supports the contention that classifying punitive damages as prospective 
relief would undermine Congress’s objective to address injunctive relief, 
but not other forms of relief. 
The only historical support for categorizing punitive damages as 
prospective relief is that an interim version of the PLRA as introduced 
on the Senate floor defined “prospective relief” as “all relief other than 
monetary damages,” leaving out the word “compensatory.”152 All other 
versions of the bill, including one submitted a day later, included the 
                                                     
145. Murphy, supra note 28, at 138. 
146. See supra notes 79–90 and accompanying text. 
147. H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 24 n.2. 
148. See supra Part I.B. 
149. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 127, at 478–79 (“Absent legislative intent to the contrary, 
or other evidence of a different meaning, legal terms in a statute are presumed to have been used in 
their legal sense.” (citations omitted)). 
150. See supra Part I. 
151. Compare supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for reviewing 
punitive damages), with supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting the PLRA’s need-
narrowness-intrusiveness standard). See also supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (describing 
the differences between the standards applied to punitive damages and injunctive relief). 
152. 141 CONG. REC. 26,450 (1995). 
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word “compensatory.”153 If these changes occurred consciously, they 
might indicate some intent to categorize punitive damages as prospective 
relief, since punitive damages are a prime example of monetary damages 
that are not compensatory. However, that version of the bill was short-
lived and the legislative history lacks any explanation as to why the 
word “compensatory” was briefly removed and then reinstated. The 
record is also void of any discussion regarding the phrase “all relief 
other than compensatory monetary damages” or why it was selected as 
the definition for prospective relief. Based on this complete dearth of 
discussion, very little if anything can be extrapolated from such a 
fleeting language change. Thus, the legislative history of the PLRA as a 
whole suggests Congress intended prospective relief to encompass 
injunctive relief, but not punitive damages. 
C. Classifying Punitive Damages as Prospective Relief Serves None of 
the PLRA’s Goals and Would Place Undue Restrictions on the 
Ability of Prisoners to Receive Punitive Damages Awards 
Punitive damages should not be classified as prospective relief under 
the PLRA because doing so serves none of the PLRA’s stated goals and 
would place undue restrictions on the ability of prisoners to receive 
punitive damages. Unlike the imposition of injunctive relief, assessing 
punitive damages once at the conclusion of a trial does not represent the 
judicial micromanaging Congress decried.154 Categorizing punitive 
damages as prospective relief does not address Congress’s concern for 
the fiscal impact of judicial micromanagement, which focused on 
indirect costs caused by wide-ranging and long-term injunctive orders 
and consent decrees rather than the direct cost of a one-time damages 
award.155 
One could argue that reducing or eliminating punitive damages 
awards serves the PLRA’s goal of saving prisons—and by extension the 
taxpayers—money. Although the states and local government entities 
that administer prisons on the whole enjoy immunity from punitive 
damages, they can be obligated indirectly to pay punitive damages if and 
when they agree to indemnify their employees against such awards.156  
                                                     
153. See id. at 26,550. 
154. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text for examples of the micromanaging Congress 
criticized. 
155. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
156. The Supreme Court has held that municipalities are immune from punitive damages in civil 
rights suits. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Lower courts have 
applied this holding to other local government entities. See, e.g., Doe v. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d 
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However, given the major differences between punitive damages and 
prospective relief,157 the consequences of classifying punitive damages 
as prospective relief are too drastic to justify doing so without clear and 
unequivocal intent of Congress. Subjecting punitive damages to the 
need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard would debilitate punitive 
damages by failing to take into consideration the goals of punishment 
and deterrence when evaluating them for reasonableness, thereby 
significantly reducing their deterrent and punitive effect.158 Furthermore, 
given that a person seeking punitive damages must satisfy the extremely 
high burden of proving not only that his rights were violated but also 
that the violation was motivated by malice or callous indifference,159 
reducing or eliminating those awards based on the inapt need-
narrowness-intrusiveness standard would cripple a key legal tool 
available only for the few prisoners who most need it and who can 
satisfy that high burden. Thus, under the PLRA, punitive damages are 
not—and should not be considered—prospective relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, punitive damages and prospective relief have served 
distinct purposes in the American judicial system. Punitive damages 
punish or deter reprehensible conduct, while prospective relief compels 
or prohibits future conduct in order to correct a violation of the law. An 
examination of the text of the PLRA and its legislative history as a 
                                                     
437, 457–58 (3d Cir. 2001) (county); Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(county sheriff’s department); Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 831 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(regional transportation authority); Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989, 991 (11th Cir. 
1987) (town). Lower courts have extended the same immunity to local officials sued in their official 
rather than their personal capacities. See Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2004); 
Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000); Ivani Contracting Corp. v. 
City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir. 1997); Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th 
Cir. 1991). But see Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that 
municipalities are immune from punitive damages does not, however, mean that individual officials 
sued in their official capacity are likewise immune.”). Also, the vast majority of states statutorily 
disallow or severely restrict the imposition of punitive damages on local government entities. See 
Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the 
Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 217–19 & nn.127–30 
(1997). However, local government entities can, and sometimes do, waive their immunities by 
voluntarily entering into indemnification agreements with officers being sued. See O’Neill v. 
Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1988). Thus, a prison that indemnifies its employees can be 
required to pay punitive damages awards assessed against those employees. 
157. See supra Part I. 
158. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
159. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
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whole reveals a clear congressional intent to regulate sweeping 
injunctive relief—the prototypical example of prospective relief—but no 
intent to subject punitive damages to those same regulations. On the 
contrary, the legislative history of the PLRA shows that the proponents 
of the statute wanted to adhere to traditional injunctive relief 
jurisprudence. 
This purpose is not served by classifying punitive damages as 
prospective relief. By holding that prospective relief under the PLRA 
includes punitive damages, the Eleventh Circuit eviscerated a valuable 
judicial tool for punishing and deterring reprehensible conduct by 
government actors against prisoners without adhering to or furthering 
the PLRA’s purpose. In order to follow the intent of the PLRA, courts 
should not classify punitive damages as prospective relief, and thus 
should not subject punitive damages to the PLRA’s need-narrowness-
intrusiveness standard. 
